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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES E. GOOD and MARY G. 
GOOD, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
DON M. CHRISTENSEN, DON M. 
CHRISTENSEN CONSTRUCTION CO., 
CONSTRUCTION REALTY, LEWIS C. 
HANSEN and BILLIE J. HANSEN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Appellants brought suit in the District 
Court for Salt Lake County alleging the negligent design 
and construction of a multi-car carport which plaintiffs 
alleged had been designed and constructed by Defend-
ants Don M. Christensen, Don M. Christensen Construc-
tion Company, and Construction Realty, which was origi-
nally built for Defendants Lewis C. Hansen and Billie J. 
Hansen, more than seven years previously. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants-Respondents moved for Summary Judg-
ment alleging that the seven-year statute of limitations set 
forth in Section 78-12-25.5 of the Utah Code Annotated 
Case No. 
13659 
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(1973 Supp.) and the four-year statute of limitations set 
forth in Section 78-12-25(2) of the Utah Code Annotated 
(1973 Supp.) barred Plaintiffs-Appellants' action, and 
the Lower Court granted Defendants-Respondents' mo-
tions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Respondents seek denial of Plaintiffs' 
appeal and affirmance of the Order entered by the Lower 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants Don M. Christen-
sen, Don M. Christensen Construction Company and Con-
struction Realty (hereinafter "Christensen") designed and 
constructed a multi-car carport in 1965. Defendants Lewis 
C. Hansen and Billie J. Hansen (hereinafter "Hansen") 
were the parties in actual possession and control as owners 
at the time the carport was designed and constructed. In 
1969, Plaintiffs James E. Good and Mary G. Good acquired 
an ownership interest in the carport. On January 1, 1973, 
subsequent to a heavy snowfall, which caused extensive 
damage throughout the area, the carport collapsed. This 
action was not commenced until more than seven years 
after the construction of the carport. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS ARE BAR-
RED FROM BRINGING THIS ACTION BY 
SECTION 78-12-25.5 OF THE UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED (1973 SUPP.). 
2 
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Section 78-12-25.5 of the Utah Code Annotated (1973 
Supp.) is specifically intended to cover the situation in 
the instant case. The statute reads as follows: 
"INJURY DUE TO DEFECTIVE DESIGN 
OR CONSTRUCTION OF IMPROVEMENT TO 
REAL PROPERTY — W I T H I N SEVEN YEARS. 
— No action to recover damages for any injury 
to property, real or personal, or for any injury to 
the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, 
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition 
of an improvement to real property, nor any action 
for damages sustained on accotmt of such injury, 
shall be brought against any person performing or 
furnishing the design, planning, supervision of con-
struction or construction of such improvement to 
real property more than seven years after the com-
pletion of construction. 
"(1) 'Person' shall mean an individual, cor-
poration, partnership, or any other legal entity. 
(2) Completion of construction for the pur-
poses of this act shall mean the date of issuance of 
a certificate of substantial completion by the own-
er, architect, engineer or other agents, or the date 
of the owner's use or possession of the improve-
ment on real property. 
"The limitation imposed by this provision 
shall not apply to any person in actual possession 
and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the 
improvement at the time the defective and unsafe 
condition of such improvement constitutes the 
proximate cause of the injury for which it is pro-
posed to bring an action. 
"This provision shall not be construed as ex-
tending or limiting the periods otherwise prescrib-
ed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any 
action." (Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-25.5 
(1973 Supp.) (Emphasis added) 
3 
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The preamble to this Act was adopted by the Legis-
lature and explains the statute as follows: 
"An Act Enacting a New Section 78-12-25.5 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Relating to the Limi-
tations of Actions by Providing a Time Limit in 
Which Actions for Injury to Property or Death 
Must Be Brought Against Persons Who Perform-
ed or Furnished the Design, Planning, Supervision 
or Construction of Improvements on Real Prop-
erty." (Laws of Utah, 1967, Chapter 218) 
Section 78-12-25.5 is an expression of the legislative 
policy decision that there should not be indefinite liability 
in cases such as the instant one. This determination is 
within the discretion of the Legislature. It determines that 
if no cause of action arises within seven years from the date 
of construction of an improvement to real property that 
the expiration of that time period is prima facie evidence 
that there was no faulty construction. This determination 
is to give effect to the legislative policy decision to bar 
litigation arising out of actions which occurred a longer 
time prior to the institution of the litigation than the 
number of years of the applicable statute of limitations. 
Similar statutes are applicable in all areas of the law. 
The legislative intent in enacting this statute was to avoid 
spurious claims, to put a limit on the amount of time in 
which a party can rely on construction defects without 
taking into consideration the necessary subsequent main-
tenance of such property, and to avoid the obvious prob-
lems regarding the admission of evidence years after the 
activity in question. 
The Supreme Court said in the case of Price v. Tuttle, 
70 Utah 156, 258 Pac. 1016 (1927): 
4 
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"(1) In the construction of statutes it is the 
duty of courts to ascertain the intent of the legisla-
tive body and, if the legislation is within the con-
stitutional power of the Legislature, to enforce 
that intent. In determining the intent of legis-
lation not only the language of the act may be con-
sidered, but the purposes or objects sought by the 
Legislature should be and are considered by the 
courts in determining the legislative intent." 
A case closely analogous to the instant case is Joseph 
v. Burns, 260 Ore. 493, 491 P.2d 203, (1971). In this 
case, the owners and others brought an action against the 
architects and engineers for damages resulting from a 
collapsed roof. The Oregon limitations law provided that 
no action could be brought more than ten years after the 
"act or omission complained of." The Oregon Supreme 
Court held that the ten-year statute of limitations applied 
". . . . from the date of the act or omission regardless 
of when the damage resulted or when the act or omission 
was discovered." 
The Washington Supreme Court reached a similar 
decision in the case of Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. 
v. Central Heat & P. Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108, 
(1972). In that decision, the Court discussed a similar 
Washington statute involving actions arising out of de-
fects in improvements to real property. The Court held 
that real property improvement, namely, the re-installa-
tion of pipes, coils, hangers, and rods that replaced those 
which had been a part of the cold storage warehouse build-
ing for forty years, was completed in 1961, but where the 
suit against the contractor was not instituted until after 
a portion of that cold storage system and equipment had 
5 
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collapsed in 1968, the suit was barred by the statute of 
limitations because the cause of action did not accrue 
within six years of the date of the completion of the work 
by the contractor. The Court in Yakima pointed out that 
since 1961 more than twenty states have enacted similar 
statutes to actions arising out of defects in improvements 
to real property. The Court also pointed out that in the 
case of Skinner v. Anderson, 38 111. 2d 455, 231 N.E. 588, 
(1967) (also cited by Plaintiffs) the Illinois Court de-
clared the Illinois statute unconstitutional as being special 
legislation in favor of only architects and contractors. The 
Washington Court distinguished the statute cited in the 
Yakima case from the statute in the Skinner case because 
the scope of the Washington statute is not limited as to 
vocation. The Utah statute is also not limited as to voca-
tion. The Utah statute bars actions against any person 
performing or furnishing the design, planning, super-
vision of construction, or construction of an improvement 
to real property. 
In the case of Salesian Society v. Formigli Corpora-
tion, 120 N J . Super. 493, 295 A.2d 19, (1972), in a suit 
by a building owner more than thirteen years after con-
struction against a contractor and sub-contractor where 
the applicable statute limited the time period for bringing 
such action to ten years, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held that this statute was not a statute of limitations but 
rather "the statute prevents from ever arising a cause of 
action against members of the protected class at a given 
point in time." 
6 
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By looking at the preamble and the body of the 
statute together, we see that the obvious intent of the 
Legislature was to place a seven-year statute of limitations 
on the claims for anyone suffering injury or death by a 
person who built, designed, planned, or supervised con-
struction or improvement on real property. This statute 
applies specifically to the conduct here in question. This, 
as a specific statute versus the broad statute of any ". . . 
action for relief not otherwise provided for by law, , , 
should take precedence over that broader statute where the 
action comes within its provisions. Plaintiffs' argument 
that this statute does not apply refers only to the fourth 
paragraph. In that paragraph, by limiting this statute with 
respect to owners and persons in actual possession or con-
trol of the property, the Legislature is saying that the per-
son who is in possession or control at the time of the crea-
tion of the ''defective and unsafe condition" does not come 
within these provisions. This is an exception made by the 
Legislature based on the policy that the owner at the time 
of the construction and the creation of the "defective and 
unsafe condition" should be exempt from this seven-year 
statute of limitations. The persons in actual possession 
and control at the time of construction and completion of 
construction were not Plaintiffs Good. Defendants 
Hansen had possession at the time of construction. 
Thus, if there was any defective and unsafe condi-
tion created, it was created during the possession and 
ownership of Hansens. 
In the case of Salesian Society vs. Formigli Corpora-
tion, supra, the New Jersey Court was required to inter-
pret a clause in the New Jersey statute which is identical 
7 
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to the clause brought into question by the Plaintiff in the 
instant case. After a lengthy discussion within which the 
Court referred to Comment, "Limitation of Actions Stat-
utes for Architects and Builders — Blueprints for Non-
action/' 18 Catholic U. L. Rev. 361, (1969), and Hearing 
No. 7 on H.R. 6527, H.R. 6678, and H.R. 11544 before 
Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Dis-
trict of Columbia, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 11, 24, 29, 
(1967), the Court then went on to hold that "the legisla-
tive intent was to insulate contractors, architects, planners 
and designers from all claims, whether in tort or in con-
tract . . . ." What the Legislature intended to preserve 
was the right to make a claim against a person "in actual 
possession or control as owner, tenant or otherwise," at the 
time of the creation of the defective condition. 
The effect of this clause in this statute is that potential 
liability for dangerous conditions is left on the owner or 
other person in possession if an injury is caused by circum-
stances giving rise to a cause of action. The Legislature 
meant to exclude from liability persons (such as Defend-
ants herein) who have been long out of possession and 
without the right or duty to make inspections and re-
pairs for conditions that may be discovered within the 
seven-year time period. 
Since the Plaintiffs were not in possession, they were 
cut off by the preceding parts of this statute. Any other 
construction would lead to an almost total obliteration of 
the statute. It would mean that only trespassers or stran-
gers would have the law extended from the four-year stat-
ute of limitations to a seven-year statute. It is the function 
8 
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of the courts to give legal effect to the intent of the Legis-
lature, not to thwart the obvious legislative intent. (See 50 
Am. Jur., Statutes, Section 227; Parkinson v. State 
Bank, 84 Utah 278, 35 P.2d 814, (1934), 94 ALR 112; 
A. Booth & Co. v. Weigand, 30 Utah 135, 83 Pac. 734, 
(1906); Rospigliosi v. Glenallen Mining Co., 69 Utah 41 , 
452 Pac. 276, (1926); Price v. Turtle, supra. 
A statute identical to the Utah statute was upheld in 
New Jersey in the case of Rosenberg v. North Bergen Tp., 
61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662, (1972), in which the Court 
held: 
"The injured party has literally no cause of 
action. The harm that has been done is damnum 
absque injuria — a wrong for which the law af-
fords no redress. The function of the statute is thus 
rather to define substantive rights rather than to 
alter or modify a remedy. A legislature is entirely 
at liberty to enact new laws or abolish old ones as 
long as no vested right is disturbed." 
In that case that statute was attacked on exactly the 
same grounds as Plaintiff is attacking this statute in the 
instant case. That statute was upheld and Plaintiff was 
denied his right of action in that statute. 
Plaintiff relies on Deschamps v. Camp Dresser & 
McKee, Inc., (N. Hamp.) 306 A.2d 771, (1973). That is 
the only case Defendants have found supporting Plain-
tiffs, and since it does not give sufficient facts to determine 
whether or not it is distinguishable from the instant case 
and no authority or reasoning is therein cited to support 
that Court's decision, Defendants find that case less than 
persuasive. 
9 
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The Legislature intended that this statute govern this 
particular type of action and therefore the Court should 
affirm the Lower Court's decision that this statute does 
govern the instant case. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE 
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS NOT 
BARRED IN THE PROVISIONS OF 78-12-
25.5, THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMI-
TATIONS AT SECTION 78-12-25 (2) IS AN 
EFFECTIVE BAR TO PLAINTIFFS' COM-
PLAINT 
Plaintiffs allege that Section 78-12-25 (2) which pro-
vides for a four-year statute of limitations is applicable 
and that the four-year period runs from the time of the 
discovery of the alleged defect or when with reasonable 
diligence the alleged defect should have been discovered. 
Plaintiffs allege that the carport in question was unlaw-
fully designed and constructed because it failed to com-
ply with local building code requirements. In the Plain-
tiffs' answer to Interrogatory No. 6, specific items are 
alleged to have been structurally inadequate. Since Plain-
tiffs' cause of action is based upon structural defects, those 
defects should have been obvious to Plaintiffs at the time 
they took possession of the property. The construction 
work complained of was open and obvious to anyone 
looking at it. There was no concealment or hidden de-
fect. Anyone in possession knew or should have known 
of its defective condition at that time. Therefore, the 
cause of action accrued at the time of completion of that 
construction. In the case of State Tax Commission v. Span-
10 
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ish Fork, 99 Utah 177, 100 P.2d 575, (1940), cited at page 
14 of Plaintiffs' brief, the Court stated as follows: 
"The question is then, when did the cause of 
action accrue? The general rule is that it accrues 
at the time it becomes remediable in the courts, 
that is when the claim is in such condition that the 
courts can receive and give judgment if the claim 
is established/' 
Assuming arguendo that the carport had been negli-
gently constructed and unlawfully designed as alleged 
by Plaintiffs, in that case, the alleged defects would have 
been discoverable and therefore remediable at the time of 
completion of the construction and the cause of action 
would have accrued at that time. 
In Poole v. Terminix, 200 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1952), 
Plaintiff had sought damages for breach of an implied 
warranty by the Defendant to do a workmanlike job in 
insulating Plaintiff's house against termites. In that case, 
Plaintiff charged that in the course of the work the De-
fendant drilled holes in the cement floor of Plaintiff's 
basement and then filled these holes with cement. Plain-
tiff alleged that the drilling damaged some tile drain be-
neath the floor, resulting in dampness in the basement, 
but the alleged injury was not discovered until some time 
later when leakage made the dampness visible. Defend-
ant raised the three-year statute of limitations as a defense. 
The suit had been filed more than three years after the 
work was done but within three years from the time when 
the alleged injury was discovered. Plaintiff contended 
that the statute did not begin to run until such discovery 
or by the exercise of ordinary diligence he would have 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
discovered the breach. The Court held that for the statute 
of limitations to begin at any time other than when a cause 
of action arose that situation must be limited to one with 
discovery prevented by fraud. The Court stated: 
"No contention is made in the present case 
upon the basis of fraud, either actual or construc-
tive. Accordingly the general rule that limitations 
begin to run from the time of breach, Zellan v. 
Cole, 1950, 87 U.S. App. D.C. 9, 183 F.2d 139, 
applies. This conforms with the purpose of stat-
utes of limitation to bring repose and to bar efforts 
to enforce stale claims as to which evidence might 
be lost or destroyed. See Bailey v. Glover, 1874, 
21 Wall. 342, 88 U.S. 342, 22 L.Ed. 636. In some 
cases no doubt this rule leads to hardship, but the 
rule for which plaintiff contends often would have 
like consequences. We must give effect to the 
policy which bars litigation due to contract 
breaches which occurred a longer time prior to 
the institution of the litigation than the number of 
years of the applicable statute of limitations. Even 
in the criminal law, absent specific provision to the 
contrary, a statute of limitations begins to run from 
the time of commission rather than of exposure of 
the alleged offense. See Synnott v. State, 1927, 38 
Okl. Cr. 281, 260 P. 517." 
It would appear that even if the limitation imposed 
by this provision does not apply to the Plaintiffs in this 
case, thus bringing the four-year statute into play, the 
terms and definitions with regard to actions of this kind 
for injuries caused by defective design or construction of 
improvement to real property are the statements of in-
tention of the Legislature and would therefore still be 
applicable. Thus, even if Plaintiff wishes to remove him-
self from the seven-year limitation, he cannot change the 
12 
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circumstances under which he brings this action nor re-
move himself from the Legislature's determination of 
when the cause of action would accrue; namely, the com-
pletion of construction as defined in Section 78-12-25.5(2) 
which would be controlling under Section 78-12-1 of the 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Appellants' actions are barred by Section 78-12-25(2) 
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
POINT III 
SECTION 78-12-25.5 OF THE UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED IS A VALID AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL EXPRESSION OF THE LEGISLA-
TIVE POLICY DECISION THAT THERE 
SHOULD NOT BE LIABILITY FOR AN IN-
DEFINITE PERIOD IN A CASE OF ALLEGED 
DEFECTIVE CONSTRUCTION. 
Such a determination is within the discretion of the 
Legislature. It has been determined, in the case of this 
statute, that if no cause of action arises within seven years 
of the date of construction then that is prima facie evi-
dence that there was no faulty construction. 
Plaintiff asserts that this statute violates the Constitu-
tion because it may extinguish a cause of action before 
that cause of action arises. 
This is not a violation of due process or equal pro-
tection. The Constitution does not guarantee a right to 
sue but only a right to due process and equal protection. 
This statute does not violate those standards because it 
is not discriminatory. It applies evenly to all injuries 
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which fall within its area of coverage. People who have 
such injuries are not in any suspect classification, and they 
are therefore not deprived of due process or equal pro-
tection. 
Plaintiff relies upon Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 
31, 151 Pac. 366, (1915), to show that 78-12-25.5 is un-
constitutional. Brown does not support Plaintiff's posi-
tion but, rather, recognizes the legislative right to place 
limitations on the right to be heard in court. It specifically 
states that where the statute does not give a remedy the 
Constitution does not require one. 
"The right and power as well as the duty, of 
creating rights and to provide remedies, lies with 
the legislature and not with the courts. The courts 
can only protect existing rights, and they may do 
that only in accordance with established and known 
remedies." 
In many cases our statutes not only extinguish a cause 
of action before the cause of action arises but they also 
completely cut off the cause of action. For example, Work-
man's Compensation cases under Section 35-1-60 cut off 
all civil liability of employers to employees under the 
Workman's Compensation Statutes. See Masich v. United 
States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., et al., 113 Utah 
101, 191 P.2d 612, (1948), where the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the employee's right to sue was entirely abrogat-
ed by the statutory provisions. 
Defendants urge the Court to take note of the United 
States Supreme Court decision, Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 
451, 1 L.Ed. 2d 1485, 77 Sup. Ct. 1344, (1957), where 
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Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, in dissent, caution against 
the invalidation of legislation in the absence of extreme 
circumstances. They state: 
"Invalidating legislation is serious business 
and it ought not to be indulged in. . . . In apply-
ing the Equal Protection Clause, we must be fastidi-
ously careful to observe the admonition of Mr. 
Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Stone, and Mr. Justice 
Cardozo that we do not sit as a super legislature. 
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 80 L.Ed. 299, 317, 
56 S.Ct. 252, 102 ALR 54 (1935)." 
This statute is a valid exercise of legislative discre-
tion within the constitutional limitations upon the legis-
lative powers. It is not unconstitutional. 
The Utah Supreme Court has often held that the 
legislative body has great discretion in fixing limits on 
classification and also that it is not within the judiciary's 
province to question the Legislature's wisdom or motives 
in enactment of a statute. See: Davis v. Ogden City, 117 
Utah 315, 215 P.2d 616, (1950), 16 ALR 2d 1208, re-
hearing denied, 118 Utah 401, 223 P.2d 412; Slater v. Salt 
Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153, (1949); Thomas v. 
Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477, 
(1948), appeal denied 69 S. Ct. 739, 336 U.S. 950, 93 L.Ed. 
1090; Rowley v. Public Service Commission, 112 Utah 
116, 185 P.2d 514, (1947); Bateman v. Board of Examin-
ers of State of Utah, 1 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381, (1958); 
Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140 P.2d 939, (1943); 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, UCA 1953, 10-3-1; and 
Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643, 
(1972). 
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POINT IV 
PLAINTIFFS ARE BARRED FROM BRING-
ING THIS ACTION BECAUSE IN FAILING 
TO ALLEGE A DUTY OWED BY DEFEND-
ANTS TO PLAINTIFFS THEY HAVE FAIL-
ED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR WHICH RE-
LIEF MAY BE GRANTED. 
In the pleadings now before this Court, Plaintiffs 
have not made any allegation of any duty, contractual, 
statutory or otherwise owed by Christensen and Hansen 
to Plaintiffs Good. In the case of Industrial Commission 
of Utah v. Wasatch Grading Co., 14 P.2d 988, 80 Utah 
223, (1932), the Court held that the complaint was in-
sufficient because it failed to disclose the essentials of 
the alleged duty between the parties therein. In the in-
stant case, Plaintiffs have failed to allege a duty owed by 
Defendants to Plaintiffs and therefore they are barred 
from bringing this action. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs are barred from bringing this action against 
Defendants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dean E. Conder 
NIELSEN, CONDER, HANSEN 
AND HENRIOD 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents Don M. Christensen, 
Don M. Christensen Construction 
Co., and Construction Realty 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Guy Burningham 
GUSTIN & GUSTIN 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents Lewis C. Hansen 
and Billie J. Hansen 
1610 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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